Cognitive Defeasible Reasoning: the Extent to Which Forms of Defeasible Reasoning Correspond with Human Reasoning by Baker, Clayton Kevin et al.
Cognitive Defeasible Reasoning:
the Extent to Which Forms of Defeasible
Reasoning Correspond with Human
Reasoning
Clayton Kevin Baker(B) , Claire Denny , Paul Freund ,
and Thomas Meyer
University of Cape Town and CAIR, Cape Town, South Africa
{bkrcla003,dnncla004,frnpau013}@myuct.ac.za, tmeyer@cs.uct.ac.za
Abstract. Classical logic forms the basis of knowledge representation
and reasoning in AI. In the real world, however, classical logic alone is
insu!cient to describe the reasoning behaviour of human beings. It lacks
the flexibility so characteristically required of reasoning under uncer-
tainty, reasoning under incomplete information and reasoning with new
information, as humans must. In response, non-classical extensions to
propositional logic have been formulated, to provide non-monotonicity. It
has been shown in previous studies that human reasoning exhibits non-
monotonicity. This work is the product of merging three independent
studies, each one focusing on a di"erent formalism for non-monotonic
reasoning: KLM defeasible reasoning, AGM belief revision and KM belief
update. We investigate, for each of the postulates propounded to char-
acterise these logic forms, the extent to which they have correspondence
with human reasoners. We do this via three respective experiments and
present each of the postulates in concrete and abstract form. We discuss
related work, our experiment design, testing and evaluation, and report
on the results from our experiments. We find evidence to believe that 1
out of 5 KLM defeasible reasoning postulates, 3 out of 8 AGM belief revi-
sion postulates and 4 out of 8 KM belief update postulates conform in
both the concrete and abstract case. For each experiment, we performed
an additional investigation. In the experiments of KLM defeasible rea-
soning and AGM belief revision, we analyse the explanations given by
participants to determine whether the postulates have a normative or
descriptive relationship with human reasoning. We find evidence that
suggests, overall, KLM defeasible reasoning has a normative relationship
with human reasoning while AGM belief revision has a descriptive rela-
tionship with human reasoning. In the experiment of KM belief update,
we discuss counter-examples to the KM postulates.
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1 Introduction
It is well-documented that human reasoning exhibits flexibility considered key to
intelligence [21], yet fails to conform to the prescriptions of classical or proposi-
tional logic [25] in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community. The AI community,
therefore, seeks to incorporate such flexibility in their work [21]. Non-classical or
non-monotonic logic is flexible by nature. Whereas classical reasoning is enough
to describe systems with a calculated output in an e!cient way, how humans
reason is non-classical because humans are known to reason in di"erent ways [25].
The problem is that non-monotonic reasoning schemes have been developed for
and tested on computers, but not on humans. There is a need to investigate
whether there exists a correspondence between non-monotonic reasoning and
human reasoning and, if so, to what extent it exists. This problem is impor-
tant because we can gain insight into how humans reason and incorporate this
into building improved non-monotonic AI systems. An issue which needs to be
considered is that humans are diverse subjects: some reason normatively while
others reason descriptively. In the case of normative reasoning, a reasoner would
conclude that a certain condition should be the case or that the condition is
usually the case. In the case of descriptive reasoning, a reasoner would make a
bold claim that a certain condition is exactly true or exactly false. We emphasise
that a thorough investigation needs to be done to determine the extent of the
correspondence between non-monotonic reasoning and how humans reason.
We propose this work as a contribution towards solving this problem. While
acknowledging that this work falls within a broader research paradigm towards
this goal [21,24,25], what di"erentiates this work is that it is, to our knowledge,
the first work with an explicit view towards testing each of these particular formal
non-monotonic frameworks: KLM defeasible reasoning [13], AGM belief revision
[1], and KM belief update [11]. We report on these frameworks in a paper due
to the close theoretical links between the frameworks’ domains. Postulates for
defeasible reasoning and belief revision may be translated from the one context
to the other [5]. Using such translations, KLM defeasible reasoning [13] can
be shown to be the formal counterpart of AGM belief revision [8]. This does
not hold for KM belief update [11]. Belief update is commonly considered a
necessarily distinct variant of belief revision for describing peoples’ beliefs in
certain domains [11].
In Sect. 2, we describe related work and the formalisms of non-monotonic
reasoning under investigation in our study. We end this section with our problem
statement. In Sect. 3, we describe the design and implementation of three distinct
surveys, one for each formalism of non-monotonic reasoning in our study. Each
survey seeks to determine the extent of correspondence between the postulates
of that formalism and human reasoning. In Sect. 4, we describe the methods used
to analyse our survey results. We present our results, discussion and conclusions
in Sect. 5. Lastly, we propose the track for future work in Sect. 6.
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2 Background
Humans are known to reason di"erently about situations in everyday life and
this reasoning behaviour can be compared to the paradigm of non-monotonic
reasoning in AI. Non-monotonic reasoning is the study of those ways of inferring
additional information from given information that does not satisfy the mono-
tonicity property, which is satisfied by all methods based on classical logic [13].
Said otherwise, non-monotonic logic fails the principle that whenever x follows
from a set A of propositions then it also follows from every set B with B ! A
[18]. With non-monotonic reasoning, a conclusion drawn about a particular sit-
uation does not always hold i.e. in light of newly gained, valid information,
previously valid conclusions have to change. This type of reasoning is described
in the context of AI [23]. We consider three forms of non-monotonic reasoning,
namely defeasible reasoning, belief revision and belief update. The latter two are
both forms of belief change [11], wherein there exists a belief base and a belief
set [6]. Explicit knowledge the agent has about the world resides in the belief
base, whereas both the explicit knowledge the agent has about the world and
the inferences derived from it reside in the belief set.
2.1 Defeasible Reasoning
Defeasible reasoning occurs when the evidence available to the reasoner does
not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn [21]. A defeasible state-
ment has two identifiable parts: an antecedent or premises and a consequence
or conclusion [7]. With classical reasoning, we proceed from valid premises to
a valid conclusion and this conclusion will never change. With defeasible rea-
soning, we can proceed from valid premises to a valid conclusion also. However,
in light of new valid information, the previously valid conclusion is allowed to
change. Either the conclusion will be supported by the new information or the
conclusion will be defeated by the new information. This defeasible reasoning
behaviour applies to many aspects of the everyday life of humans, where the
information available to the reasoner is often incomplete or contains errors. As
such, defeasible information often involves information that is considered typi-
cal, normal or plausible. We shall now illustrate this with an example. Consider
the following statements: employees pay tax and Alice is an employee. From the
statements given, can we conclude that Alice pays tax? In the classical case, we
can only conclude that Alice pays tax. Using defeasible reasoning, we can also
conclude that Alice pays tax. However, should we receive additional information
about Alice that she is not a typical employee, we can change our conclusion
to be Alice does not pay tax. In this case, we have to amend our premises to
account for the defeasible information viz. employees typically pay tax and Alice
is not a typical employee.
2.2 Belief Revision
In belief revision, conflicting information indicates flawed prior knowledge
on the part of the agent, forcing the retraction of conclusions drawn from
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it [11,19]. Information is then taken into account by selecting the models of the
new information closest to the models of the base, where a model of information
µ is a state of the world in which µ is true [11]. An example of this reasoning
pattern will now be described. Consider the same statements used above in the
defeasible reasoning example. Using the reasoning pattern of belief revision, we
can infer from our beliefs that Alice does pay tax. Suppose we now receive new
information: Alice does not pay tax. This is inconsistent with our belief base, so a
decision must be made regarding which beliefs to retract prior to adding the new
information into our beliefs. We could revise our beliefs to be that employees pay
tax and Alice does not pay tax. In [4], this decision is proposed to be influenced
by whether we believe some statements more strongly than others. In [1], it is
proposed to be influenced by closeness (the concept of minimal change), in that
we aim to change as little about our existing knowledge as we can do without
having conflicting beliefs.
2.3 Belief Update
In belief update, conflicting information is seen as reflecting the fact that the
world has changed, without the agent being wrong about the past state of the
world. To get an intuitive grasp of the distinction between belief update and
revision, take the following example adapted from [11]. Let b be the proposition
that the book is on the table, and m be the proposition that the magazine is on
the table. Say that our belief set includes (b " ¬m) # (¬b "m), that is the book
is on the table or the magazine is on the table, but not both. We send a student
in to report on the state of the book. She comes back and tells us that the book is
on the table, that is b. Under the AGM [1] postulates for belief revision proposed
in [1], we would be warranted in concluding that b"¬m, that is, the book is on
the table and the magazine is not. But consider if we had instead asked her to
ensure that the book was on the table. After reporting, we again are faced with
the new knowledge that b. This time adding the new knowledge corresponds
to the case of belief update. And here it seems presumptuous to conclude that
the magazine is not on the table [11]. Either the book was already on the table
and the magazine was not, in which case the student would have done nothing
and left, or the magazine was on the table and the book not, in which case the
student presumably would have simply put the book on the table and left the
magazine similarly so. As these examples are formally identical, there is a need
for di"erent formalisms to accommodate both cases.
2.4 Problem Statement
We propose a first study to address the gap between the postulates of KLM [13]
defeasible reasoning, AGM [1] belief revision and KM [11] belief update, and
human reasoning.
Research Question: To what extent do the postulates of defeasible reasoning,
belief revision and belief update correspond with human reasoning?
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We have investigated three approaches to non-monotonic reasoning: the KLM
[13] defeasible reasoning approach, the AGM [1] belief revision approach and the
KM [11] belief update approach. In additional investigations, the reasoning style
of participants, normative or descriptive, was identified in the cases of defeasible
reasoning and belief revision. For belief update, the additional investigation was
to find counter-examples to the KM [11] postulates.
3 Implementation
In this section, we describe the design and implementation of three surveys: one
each for defeasible reasoning, belief revision, and belief update. We also describe
our implementation strategy and expected challenges. Finally, we document our
testing and evaluation strategy. The major reason for our choice of the survey
as a testing instrument was its ease of integration with Mechanical Turk, which
was the channel we had chosen for sourcing our participants. Moreover, the web-
based survey is a common tool used in sociological research, such that “it might
be considered an essential part of the sociological toolkit” [32]. Future work may
look towards testing our research questions in a non-survey environment.
3.1 Survey Designs
Each of the three surveys focused on testing a particular formalism of non-
monotonic reasoning: survey 1 tested defeasible reasoning, survey 2 tested belief
revision and survey 3 tested belief update. 30 responses were wanted per survey.
Participants were asked whether they accepted the conclusions proposed by the
postulates of the formalism of non-monotonic reasoning in question, and were
asked to give an explanation for their answer. The postulates were presented
in concrete and abstract form. The concrete part of the survey consisted of
the translations of all the postulates into English sentences. The abstract part
consisted of the translations of all the postulates into variables, denoted by
capital letters from the English alphabet. The logical behaviour of the postulates
was maintained in the translations of these postulates from propositional logic to
their concrete and abstract forms, respectively. For a particular postulate in the
concrete case, the premises and conclusion were substituted with sentences from
the English language. In the abstract case, the premises and conclusion were
substituted by variables using letters from the English alphabet. Together, the
premises and conclusion for each postulate created a story for the participant to
read. The stories used in the concrete part of the survey were designed to mimic
an environment in which a general reasoner might find himself. For example,
some of the stories related to reasoning about students and homework, whilst
others related to reasoning about the weather. The stories used in the abstract
part were less verbose as no context was given to indicate the meaning of the
variables used. An example of a concrete, story-style or real-world question would
be: If Cathy has a cake to bake, will she use an oven?. An example of an abstract
question would be: given the following, If A then B, and If C then A, can we
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say that If C then B? The survey questions can be navigated to by means of
Appendix A for reference.
Survey 1. This survey tested participants’ ability to reason defeasibly. Partic-
ipants were asked whether they accepted the conclusions proposed by the KLM
[13] postulates of defeasible reasoning and were required to provide explana-
tions for their reasoning. We refer to the KLM [13] postulates of Left Logical
Equivalence (LLE), Right Weakening (RW), And, Or and Cautious Monotonic-
ity (CM), included in Appendix A for reference. The KLM [13] postulates were
presented as textual stories containing a set of information, or premises, and a
proposed conclusion. For each postulate, the stories were included in concrete
and abstract form. The concrete form of the postulates was kept separately from
the abstract form. The concrete part of the survey was presented to participants
first. The abstract part was presented next. For both the concrete and abstract
parts, the order of the postulates was randomised. Crucial to this study, the
explanations given by participants were used to identify whether they reasoned
normatively or descriptively. This survey also tested participants’ ability to rea-
son defeasibly in a broader sense. In particular, additional defeasible reasoning
postulates were presented to participants. This was done by presenting each pos-
tulate in concrete and abstract form and asking participants to reason as before.
In the concrete case only, participants’ ability to reason under two distinctive
subcategories of defeasible reasoning, prototypical reasoning and presumptive
reasoning, was tested. Prototypical reasoning [17] suggests each reasoning sce-
nario assumes a model with certain typical features, whereas presumptive rea-
soning [31] suggests that an argument may have multiple possible consequences.
As an avenue for future work, the ability for participants to reason prototypi-
cally and presumptively could be tested in greater detail with scope to include
testing participants’ ability to reason in the abstract case.
Survey 2. The questions in this survey were developed to test whether postu-
lates of a specific formalisation of the process of belief revision feature in cogni-
tive reasoning. The formalisation used is that of the eight-postulate approach as
proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1]. We refer to the
eight-postulate approach as the AGM [1] postulates of Closure, Success, Inclu-
sion, Vacuity, Consistency, Extensionality, Super-expansion and Sub-expansion,
included in Appendix A for reference. Two types of questions were developed:
concrete and abstract. This involved designing scenarios in which to ground the
concrete questions. Five such scenarios were designed. Abstract questions were
developed directly based on the formal postulates. The abstract questions were
included to test the postulates without having the agent’s knowledge of the
world hindering their answers and to have questions which are less semantically
loaded [16] than real-world concrete questions. The benefit of abstract examples
is further discussed by Pelletier and Elio [21]. The concrete questions started as
abstract representations explicitly requiring the application of one or some of the
formal postulates to obtain the desired answer. These representations were then
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elaborated in the context of a scenario. The scenarios designed are: linguists,
smoking, wildlife, bag of stationery and, acrobats. The scenarios designed are
inspired by the literature and the researcher’s knowledge of the world.
Survey 3. The questions in this survey were developed to test the KM approach
[11] to belief update. The KM [11] postulates we used are included as postulates
U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6, U7 and U8 in Appendix A. These postulates mir-
rored the eight-postulate approach for belief revision, with the core di"erence
between the postulates for revision and the postulates for update being the type
of knowledge referred to: static knowledge for revision and dynamic knowledge
for update. The questions in this survey were broken into three sets. The first
consisted of abstract questions, in which the KM [11] postulates were presented
and participants were asked to rate their agreement with the postulates on a lin-
ear or Likert scale with extremal points “strongly agree”and “strongly disagree”.
The postulates were presented using non-technical language. The second set of
questions were concrete questions that were meant to be confirming instances of
each of the eight KM postulates, where participants were asked to answer either
Yes or No, and motivate their answer. The third set followed the same format
as the second but was meant to present counter-examples to the postulates,
with the counter-examples largely sourced from the literature. The first counter-
example was based on the observation that updating p by p # q does not a"ect
the KM approach [9], which seems counter-intuitive. The second was based on
the observation that updating by an inclusive disjunction leads to the exclusive
disjunction being believed in the right conditions (a modification of the checker-
board example in [9]), which again seems counter-intuitive. The third was based
on the observation that sometimes belief revision semantics seem appropriate in
cases corresponding to the way that belief update is commonly, and has been
here, presented in [15]. The final is an example testing a counter-intuitive result
of treating equivalent sentences as leading to equivalent updates.
3.2 Mechanical Turk
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a service provided by Amazon that serves as an
interface between service Requesters and a network of Workers. It addresses
three problems [10]. It is used by software developers to incorporate human
intelligence into software applications. It is used by business people to access a
large network of human intelligence to complete tasks such as conducting market
research. It is used by people looking to earn money to find work that can be
done anywhere and at any time, using skills they already have. We used MTurk
for access to its network of people to complete our surveys, which were hosted
on Google Forms. An advantage is that its network of Workers includes people
from a large range of ages, education levels and places [26]. Such places include
the United States of America, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the
Philippines [26].
Although we did not set out to target a specific population of reasoners,
MTurk o"ered a choice of up to 3 di"erent qualifications that our Workers must
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satisfy. For the defeasible reasoning survey, Workers were required to be Mas-
ter Workers, a qualification assigned by MTurk to top Workers who consistently
submit high-quality results. Workers were required to have a HIT Approval Rate
(%) for all Requesters’ HITs $ 97, and have more than 0 HITs approved. For
the belief revision survey, two MTurk qualifications and one internal qualifi-
cation was used to recruit participants. Workers were required to have a HIT
Approval Rate (%) for all Requesters’ HITs > 98, and have more than 5000
HITs approved. The required number of HITs approved was varied, between
1000 and 5000, to allow for a diverse sample of respondents. We created one
internal qualification to ensure that the 30 respondents were unique across all
of the published batches of the survey. This qualification was called Completed
my survey already and assigned to Workers which have submitted a response
in a previous batch, including the batch of the trial HIT. For the belief update
survey, a single qualification was used: only Master Workers were allowed to
participate in the survey.
3.3 Google Forms
Google Forms is an application which allows users to create and disseminate
free online surveys. Research performed in 2018 revealed that the recent surge of
low-quality qualitative data from MTurk is primarily due to international Turk-
ers (workers on MTurk) [30] using Virtual Private Networks or Virtual Private
Servers to waive qualifications required to complete surveys [12]. This motivated
including a checkpoint within the surveys themselves, considering the surveys
were answered online. The checkpoint comprised custom captchas and an atten-
tion check, designed to be an indicator of the respondent’s suitability to take the
survey. In this context, suitability comprises four requirements: (i) the response
is not generated by a bot, (ii) the respondent is not using a script, (iii) the
respondent can understand English, (iv) the respondent reads questions in full.
Requirements i and ii address that the respondent must be a human. Require-
ment iii addresses that the survey questions are in English and require English
answers. This limits the survey’s population of potential respondents, as the
respondent’s English proficiency may a"ect their performance on the HIT e.g. in
their interpretation of double negatives. A Human Intelligence Task (HIT) is any
activity that can be performed on a computer by a human actor e.g. writing an
essay. MTurk o"ered varying ages, backgrounds and other such contextual fac-
tors, resulting in it also presenting the challenge of verifying English proficiency
levels, as understanding English is a broad classification.
We sought to clarify whether their understanding of a question posed in
English was su!cient to answer correctly a trick question. We considered two
options: to create a separate, qualifying HIT or include the qualifier as part
of the survey. We chose the latter. Finally, requirement iv addresses that the
respondent must be paying attention and reading all the information presented
as prior knowledge before answering a question. If the respondent failed to meet
requirement iv, we would lack cause to believe our assumption of what comprises
their prior knowledge in later questions would not be violated.
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3.4 Testing and Evaluation
Each of our surveys were evaluated by a group of both laypeople and experts for
clarity. Each of our surveys were also published on MTurk as a trial HIT. The
results of the trial HITs were used to gauge how Turkers might respond to the
final survey.
Feedback from Groups of Laypeople and Experts. We asked a variety of
experts and non-experts to evaluate our survey for coherence, clarity and other
desirable characteristics of questions, more examples of which can be found in
[14]. One of the authors evaluated each of the three surveys. We also approached
an expert in psychology and an expert in philosophy, at the University of Cape
Town, however they were not available to evaluate our surveys. The remain-
ing experts who evaluated the survey questions included one Masters student
in Computer Science, as well as two Computer Science Honours students also
conducting studies on non-monotonic reasoning forms. One of the surveys was
evaluated by an international doctoral student in language and African studies.
Based on the suggestions from experts and laypeople, a variety of changes were
made to the surveys.
Trial HITs. A trial of the surveys was conducted, (i) to gain familiarity with
the MTurk service and platform and (ii) to test the survey and its questions
on a sample of Turkers. It involved three separate postings of the survey links
as HITs on the site, each requiring five responses. The HIT was created with
certain specifications accordingly. Workers were compensated R30 (above the
South African hourly minimum wage) for completing the tasks, and the tasks
included a time estimate, all of which were under an hour. We did not restrict
workers by location, but required that they should have completed a certain
number of HITs previously, and have a certain approval rating ($95%) for their
tasks, as recommended by Amazon to improve response quality [29]. A Turker’s
approval rating refers to the percentage of their tasks that have been approved or
accepted by the Requesters who published them. Based on the results from the
trial survey, changes were made for the final experiments. The changes included
increasing both the compensation and the estimated completion time.
3.5 Ethical, Professional and Legal Issues
Ethical issues are those which require a choice to be made between options based
on whether they evaluate as ethical or unethical. Professional issues here refer to
those which pertain to ethical standards and rules that the profession of Com-
puter Science has for its members, particularly with respect to research. Ethical
and professional issues thus overlap. Legal issues refer to those which involve
the law. As this project involved experiments with people, ethical clearance was
obtained from the University of Cape Town Faculty of Science Human Research
Ethics Committee before proceeding with the experiments. The primary issue
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in the experiments was the use of MTurk, in particular, whether Workers were
being paid a fair wage for their work. Per [2], the following three steps were
taken to mitigate these concerns. First, workers were paid more than the South
African minimum wage for an hour’s work. Second, in the title of the task, the
estimated amount of time needed for the task was clearly stated. Finally, there
is a section in the survey which gives an overview of what the research concerns,
placing the work in context. Workers were also required to give their informed
consent to participate in the study. This was achieved by having a consent form
at the start of the survey, whereby workers could either agree to participate in
the research and then continue to the rest of the survey, or they could decline to
participate and be thanked for their time. Contact details of the researchers were
also provided. Before the data-handling, all survey responses were anonymised.
We also did not collect names, cellphone numbers or email addresses from our
participants. The only personal contact information we collected from each par-
ticipant was their Amazon Turk WorkerID. To view our survey questions, raw
collected data and the codebooks used for data analysis, click here.
4 Methods of Analysis
Responses were rejected if the participant failed the checkpoint section in the
survey. In our analysis, we reference applying a baseline of 50% to our results.
The choice of 50% as a baseline was arbitrary, but it served as a tool to evaluate
the meaning of our results. As a starting point for evaluation and a baseline for
agreement, it was basic and could be improved upon in future work.
4.1 Survey 1
The defeasible reasoning survey had 30 responses, which were downloaded from
Google Forms. One response was rejected due to the participant submitting
twice. Coding of participant responses was performed using Microsoft Excel
functions. The coding spreadsheet is included in our Github repository, refer-
enced in Appendix A. For this survey, we assumed that the KLM [13] postulate
of Reflexivity, the idea that a proposition x defeasibly entails itself, holds for
all human reasoners and therefore it was not tested. Feedback from our super-
visor indicated that a few survey questions were not appropriate models of the
KLM [13] postulates they intended to test, as they used the word some in the
conclusion. These were questions 6 and 7, referring to the KLM [13] postulates
of Right Weakening and And, respectively. In the following, we state question 6
as was presented in the survey, as an example, to clarify. The given information
was presented as a numbered list and the conclusion was phrased as a question.
Question 6, testing Right Weakening, asked: given i) no police dogs are vicious
and ii) highly trained dogs are typically police dogs, can you conclude that some
highly trained dogs are vicious? We draw the reader’s attention to the fact that
the word some is not part of the definition of the KLM [13] postulates. Thus,
we have removed the responses to these questions in our analysis of the results.
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Quantitative Data. In our collected data, participant agreement with the
postulates, the Yes or No responses, were considered quantitative data. This
agreement was measured using a hit rate. The hit rate (%) for each postulate
was calculated as with the formula: number of Yes responsestotal number of responses % 100. Hit rates were
measured for each postulate in the concrete and the abstract case. A postulate
with a hit rate of $50% in both the concrete and abstract case was said to have
agreement with the participants in this survey. We plotted the concrete and
abstract hit rate for each defeasible reasoning postulate as well as the concrete
hit rates for prototypical reasoning and presumptive reasoning, in Fig. 1. Where
no data was available, this was indicated by a blank in the figure.
Qualitative Data. In our collected data, the explanations given by participants
were considered qualitative data. We have identified four main emerging themes
for participant explanations. The theme Support refers to an explanation which
contained only information given in the question. The theme Speculative refers
to an explanation for which there is partial support from the given information,
but also in which external information, not present in the question, is consid-
ered. Technical refers to an explanation which contains the phrase typically, but
not always. The theme Other refers to explanations which did not fit into any
of the above categories and often contained explanations which were vague or
explanations quoted from an external source but contained nonsensical words.
After identifying these four themes, we have pooled the explanations from the
Support and Technical themes and qualified these together as normative. We
have qualified explanations fitting the Speculative theme as descriptive.
4.2 Survey 2
The belief revision survey had 40 participants, as 10 responses were rejected; 30
responses were used. Analysis of the Questions section of the survey, for both
the trial and final survey, comprised finding the modal answer and hit rate for
each closed question and performing qualitative analysis on the open questions.
The data was downloaded from Google Forms and Mechanical Turk.
Quantitative Data. The modal answer and hit rate (%) for closed questions
were calculated by applying Microsoft Excel functions to the data. A hit indi-
cates success. In this context, success is defined as both the respondent and the
application of the belief revision postulates obtaining the same answer. The hit
rate is thus calculated for each question as number of successesno. of responses %100. The analysis
of the results employs a baseline of a hit rate of 50% to indicate overall success.
Qualitative Data. The qualitative analysis was performed in NVivo, a qual-
itative data analysis software package, and made use of Tesch’s Eight Steps in
the Coding Process [3]. In this process, a combination of pre-determined and
emerging codes were used. Codes on topics expected to be found were taken
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from literature, based on the theory being empirically tested. These include
the eight postulates of belief revision as proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors
and Makinson [1]: closure, success, inclusion, vacuity, consistency, extensionality,
super-expansion, sub-expansion. Other pre-determined codes include: normative
and descriptive. Emerging codes are those which were not anticipated at the
beginning, or are both unusual and of interest. They are developed solely on the
basis of the data collected from respondents by means of the survey. An exam-
ple of an emerging code used in the trial of this study is It is stated. This code
represents the respondent taking a passive approach to their response. Other
examples would be real-world influence and likelihood.
Pre-determined codes normative and descriptive refer to the reasoning style
identified in responses to open questions. A normative style involves making
value judgements [20], commenting on whether something is the way it should be
or not. This includes implied judgements through the use of emotive language.
A descriptive style, in contrast, does not - it involves making an observation,
commenting on how something is [20].
4.3 Survey 3
Quantitative Data. The belief update survey had 34 participants, of which 4
responses were rejected. For the quantitative data, two forms of analysis were
chosen, corresponding to the two di"erent forms of quantitative data (ordinal
and binary) gathered. For the ordinal (Likert-type) data, the median is an appro-
priate measure of central tendency [28], and thus was chosen, and for the binary
data, the hit rate as above was chosen. Relating this back to the research ques-
tion, a postulate was seen as confirmed if it saw both a hit rate $50% for the
confirming concrete example, and a median value of agree or better.
Qualitative Data. For the qualitative data, emerging codes were developed for
Sect. 2 on a per question basis. This was so as to better interpret the quantitative
results, and, in particular with the counter-examples, to see whether the reasons
given by participants for their answers matched the theory behind the objections
as given in the literature. Similar to the belief revision case, a common code was
new information should be believed, which corresponds to the case of simply
believing new information.
5 Results, Discussion and Conclusions
To answer our research question, we found several correspondences between the
KLM [13] approach for defeasible reasoning, the AGM [1] approach for belief
revision and the KM [11] approach for belief update, and how our participants
reasoned. For defeasible reasoning, there was correspondence with one KLM [13]
postulate (refer to Fig. 1): Or. For belief revision, there was correspondence with
three AGM [1] postulates (refer to Fig. 2): Success, Vacuity and Closure. For
belief update, there was correspondence with four KM [11] postulates (refer to
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Fig. 3): U1, U3, U4 and U6. For each of the three surveys, we present addi-
tional results that are of importance. Our surveys were designed separately and
contained slightly di"ering methodologies, so we have not attempted a holistic
comparison of the results. Future work might do so. Discussion of less expected
results from each survey can be found at either of the links in Appendix Sect.
A.1, in the respective individual papers.
5.1 Additional Results for KLM Defeasible Reasoning
The KLM [13] postulate Or shows agreement with our participants, suggested by
both the concrete and abstract hit rates being $50% (concrete hit rate 75,86%,
abstract hit rate 58,62%). In addition to Or, 2 out of 5 KLM [13] postulates
show agreement in the concrete case only: Left Logical Equivalence (55,17%)
and Cautious Monotonicity (72,41%). Across all KLM [13] postulates tested in
this study, where both concrete and abstract hit rates were present, we observed
the pattern that the concrete hit rate was always higher than abstract hit rate.
The additional defeasible reasoning postulates we have investigated were Ratio-
nal Monotonicity, Transitivity and Contraposition, included in Appendix A for
reference. The defeasible reasoning postulate of Transitivity shows acceptance
by our survey participants (concrete 72,41%, abstract 65,52%). In the case of
Contraposition, a change in hit rate pattern was observed: it was the only pos-
tulate for which neither hit rate exceeded the baseline hit rate $50%, suggesting
a negative relationship with our participants’ reasoning, and it was the only
postulate for which the abstract hit rate (41,38%) was higher than the concrete
hit rate (17,24%). We observed that Rational Monotonicity had the largest dif-
ference between hit rates. The di"erence between the concrete and abstract hit
rates for Rational Monotonicity was 65,51%, with a significant agreement in the
concrete case (concrete 72,41%). In our investigation of participant agreement
with prototypical reasoning and presumptive reasoning, we also observed strong
agreement in the concrete case with both concrete hit rates $85%. Our addi-
tional investigation sought to identify whether participants reasoned normatively
or descriptively. We found that across the majority of KLM [13] postulates and
additional defeasible reasoning postulates, participants explained their accep-
tance or disagreement using a normative reasoning style. This can be explained
by (1) participants relying mainly on the information given in the study and (2)
participants accepting the information given in the study as plausible.
5.2 Additional Results for AGM Belief Revision
The hit rates were taken as indications of the type of relationship between
human reasoning and the relevant AGM [1] postulates. For the concrete and
abstract questions for postulates Success (concrete hit rate 90%, abstract hit
rate 76.67%), Closure (concrete 100%, abstract 53.33%) and Vacuity (concrete
50%, abstract 56.67%), the hit rates obtained were $50%, suggesting a positive
relationship between human reasoning and those postulates. Postulates Exten-
sionality (concrete 26.67%, abstract 40%), Super-expansion (concrete 38.33%,
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abstract 36.67%) and Consistency (concrete 50%, abstract 36.67%) received hit
rates &50%, suggesting a negative relationship. Postulates Sub-expansion (con-
crete 76.67%, abstract 40%) and Inclusion (concrete 23.33%, abstract 60%) had
discrepancies of >30% between the hit rates for their concrete and abstract
questions, and their relationships to human reasoning thus found to be incon-
clusive. Through an additional investigation, we found that participants have a
predominantly descriptive relationship with belief revision when postulates are
presented both in concrete and abstract form. The balance of descriptive and
normative reasoning styles of respondents in their responses became more even
for the abstract questions, perhaps suggesting an increasing reliance on perceived
rules in situations to which humans are less able to relate.
5.3 Additional Results for KM Belief Update
When reporting the abstract results in this section, the first number indicates
the median of the participants’ attitudes towards the postulate if 0 = strongly
disagree and 5 = strongly agree. The subsequent percentage is the percentage
of people who agreed or strongly agreed with the postulate. The concrete ques-
tions and counter-examples were sometimes tested using multiple questions. The
hit rate for such postulates refers to the question with the lowest percentage of
conformance with the postulate. U1 (concrete 90%, abstract: 4; 76.7%), U3
(concrete 76.7%, abstract: 4; 56.7%), U4 (concrete 66.7%, abstract: 4; 76.7%)
and U6 (concrete 76.7%, abstract: 4; 66.7%) saw hit rates uniformly >50%. U2
(concrete 76.7%, abstract: 3; 50%) and U5 (concrete 90%, abstract: 3; 50%) saw
a neutral median abstract Likert score; with a correspondingly split abstract hit
rate. U7 (concrete 76.7%, abstract: 2.5; 36.7%) and U8 (concrete 90% , abstract:
3; 43.3%) saw an abstract hit rate of <50%. Qualitatively, all postulates exclud-
ing U5 and U7, saw codes such that the majority reason for agreement with
the concrete questions was theoretically in accordance with the postulate. All of
the counter-examples examined saw hit rates >50%. The first counter-example
(hit rate 63.3%) followed from U2. The second counter-example (83.3%) follows
from the set of U1, U4, and U5. The third counter-example (60%) was against
U8. The final counter-example (70%) follows independently from U4, and the set
of U1 and U6. Although implicated theoretically, qualitative analysis suggested
participants still reasoned in accordance with U1 in the counter-examples.
6 Future Work
Our results suggest that the models of KLM defeasible reasoning [13], AGM
belief revision [1] and KM belief update [11] are not yet a perfect fit with human
reasoning because participants failed to reason in accordance with many of the
postulates of these models. A larger participant pool is required to confirm our
results. In future work, it may be interesting to add blocks to the study, in
the form of di"erent control groups e.g. paid reasoners as opposed to unpaid
reasoners, to explore the e"ects of di"erent circumstances on cognitive reasoning
and which logic form is most closely resembled in each such block.
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A Appendix: Supplementary Information
A.1 External Resources
We have created a GitHub repository which contains additional resources for
this project. In this repository, we include our survey questions, our raw data
and the codebooks used for our data analysis. As mentioned in the abstract,
this work is the product of merging three independent papers: one each for
KLM [13] defeasible reasoning, AGM belief revision [1] and KM belief update
[11]. These independent papers are also included in the GitHub repository. The
GitHub repository can be accessed by clicking here. In addition, a summary of
our project work is also showcased on our project website which can be viewed
by clicking here.
A.2 Defeasible Reasoning
KLM Postulates. Table 1 presents the KLM postulates. For ease of compari-
son, we present the postulates translated in a manner similar to [27]. We write
Cn(S) to represent the smallest set closed under classical consequence containing
all sentences in S, and DC(S) to represent the resulting set if defeasible conse-
quence is used instead. DC(S) is assumed defined only for finite S. Cn(!) is an
abbreviation for Cn({!}), and DC(!) is an abbreviation for DC({!}).
Table 1. KLM postulates
1 Reflexivity ! ! DC(!)
2 Left Logical Equivalence If ! " " then DC(!) = DC(")
3 Right Weakening If ! ! DC(") and # ! Cn(!) then # ! DC(")
4 And If ! ! DC(") and # ! DC(") then ! # # ! DC(")
5 Or If ! ! DC(") and ! ! DC(#) then ! ! DC(" $ #)
6 Cautious Monotonicity If ! ! DC(") and # ! DC(") then # ! DC(" # !)
Reflexivity states that if a formula is satisfied, it follows that the formula can
be a consequence of itself. Left Logical Equivalence states that logically equiva-
lent formulas have the same consequences. Right Weakening expresses the fact
that one should accept as plausible consequences all that is logically implied
by what one thinks are plausible consequences. And expresses the fact that the
conjunction of two plausible consequences is a plausible consequence. Or says
that any formula that is, separately, a plausible consequence of two di"erent
formulas, should also be a plausible consequence of their disjunction. Cautious
Monotonicity expresses the fact that learning a new fact, the truth of which
could have been plausibly concluded, should not invalidate previous conclusions.
Additional Postulates. Table 2 presents additional defeasible reasoning pos-
tulates. Cut expresses the fact that one may, in his way towards a plausible
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conclusion, first add an hypothesis to the facts he knows to be true and prove
the plausibility of his conclusion from this enlarged set of facts and then
deduce (plausibly) this added hypothesis from the facts. Rational Monotonicity
expresses the fact that only additional information, the negation of which was
expected, should force us to withdraw plausible conclusions previously drawn.
Transitivity expresses that if the second fact is a plausible consequence of the
first and the third fact is a plausible consequence of the second, then the third
fact is also a plausible consequence of the first fact. Contraposition allows the
converse of the original proposition to be inferred, by the negation of terms and
changing their order.
Table 2. Additional postulates
1 Cut If ! ! DC(" # #) and # ! DC(") then ! ! DC(")
2 Rational Monotonicity If ! /! DC(" # #) and ¬" /! DC(#) then ! /! DC(#)
3 Transitivity If ! ! DC(") and # ! DC(!) then # ! DC(")
4 Contraposition If ! ! DC(") then ¬" ! DC(¬!)
A.3 Belief Revision
AGM Postulates. Table 3 presents the AGM postulates. K '! is the sentence
representing the knowledge base after revising the knowledge base K with !.
We assume that K is a set that is closed under classical deductive consequence.
Table 3. AGM postulates
1 Closure K % ! = Cn(K % !)
2 Success ! ! K % !
3 Inclusion K % ! & Cn(K ' {!})
4 Vacuity If ¬! /! K then Cn(K ' {!}) & K % !
5 Consistency K % ! = Cn(! # ¬!) only if |= ¬!
6 Extensionality If ! " " then K % ! = K % "
7 Super-expansion K % (! # ") & Cn(K % ! ' {"})
8 Sub-expansion If ¬" /! K then Cn(K % ! ' {"}) & K % (! # ")
Closure implies logical omniscience on the part of the ideal agent or reasoner,
including after revision of their belief set. Success expresses that the new infor-
mation should always be part of the new belief set. Inclusion and Vacuity are
motivated by the principle of minimum change. Together, they express that
in the case of information !, consistent with belief set or knowledge base K,
belief revision involves performing expansion on K by ! i.e. none of the origi-
nal beliefs need to be withdrawn. Consistency expresses that the agent should
prioritise consistency, where the only acceptable case of not doing so is if the
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new information, !, is inherently inconsistent - in which case, success overrules
consistency. Extensionality e"ectively expresses that the content i.e. the belief
represented, and not the syntax, a"ects the revision process, in that logically
equivalent sentences or beliefs will cause logically equivalent changes to the belief
set. Super-expansion and sub-expansion is motivated by the principle of minimal
change. Together, they express that for two propositions ! and ", if in revising
belief set K by ! one obtains belief set K’ consistent with ", then to obtain the
e"ect of revising K with !"", simply perform expansion on K’ with ". In short,
K ' (! " ") = (K ' !) + ".
Table 4. KM postulates
1 (U1) ! ! K ( !
2 (U2) If ! ! K then K ( ! = K
3 (U3) K ( ! = Cn(! # ¬!) only if |= ¬! or K = Cn(! # ¬!)
4, (U4) If ! " " then K ( ! = K ( "
5, (U5) K ( (! # ") & Cn(K ( ! ' {"})
6 (U6) If " ! K ( ! and ! ! K ( " then K ( ! = K ( "
7 (U7) If K is complete then K ( (" $ !) & Cn(K ( ! ' K ( ")




9 (U*9) K ( ! = Cn(K ( !)
A.4 Belief Update
KM Postulates. Table 4 presents the KM postulates. For ease of comparison,
the postulates have been rephrased as in the AGM paradigm [22]. We use ( to
represent the update operator. U1 states that updating with the new fact must
ensure that the new fact is a consequence of the update. U2 states that updating
on a fact that could in principle be already known has no e"ect. U3 states the
reasonable requirement that we cannot lapse into impossibility unless we either
start with it, or are directly confronted by it. U4 requires that syntax is irrelevant
to the results of an update.U5 says that first updating on! then simply adding the
new information # is at least as strong (i.e. entails) as updating on the conjunction
of! and #.U6 states that if updating on!1 entails !2 and if updating on!2 entails
!1, then the e"ect of updating on either is equivalent.U7 applies only to complete
knowledge bases, that is knowledge bases with a single model. If some situation
arises from updating a complete K on ! and it also results from updating that K
from " then it must also arise from updating that K on !#".U8 is the disjunction
rule. U*9 is not necessary in the propositional formulation of the postulates and
is listed for completeness. It was not tested in the survey.
A.5 Results
In Fig. 1, we show the Hit Rate (%) for each defeasible reasoning postulate. In
Fig. 2, we show the Hit Rate (%) for each belief revision postulate. In Fig. 3, we
show the Hit Rate (%) for each belief update postulate.
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Fig. 1. Hit rate (%) for defeasible reasoning postulates
Fig. 2. Hit rate (%) for belief revision postulates
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Fig. 3. Hit rate (%) for belief update postulates
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